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Synchronized action is considered as a manifestation of shared skill. Most synchronized
behaviors in humans and other animals are based on periodic repetition. Aperiodic synchro-
nization of complex action is found in the experimental task of synchronous speaking, in
which naive subjects read a common text in lock step.The demonstration of synchronized
behavior without a periodic basis is presented as a challenge for theoretical understand-
ing. A uniﬁed treatment of periodic and aperiodic synchronization is suggested by replacing
the sequential processing model of cognitivist approaches with the more local notion of
a task-speciﬁc sensorimotor coordination. On this view, skilled action is the imposition of
constraints on the co-variation of movement and sensory ﬂux such that the boundary con-
ditions that deﬁne the skill are met. This non-cognitivist approach originates in the work
of John Dewey. It allows a uniﬁcation of the treatment of sensorimotor synchronization in
simple rhythmic behavior and in complex skilled behavior and it suggests that skill sharing
is a uniquely human trait of considerable import.
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How can we know the dancer from the dance? (W. B. Yeats)
1. INTRODUCTION
Synchronized action, or doing the same thing at the same time,
is a very speciﬁc form of interpersonal coordination. Indeed, the
difference between synchronized, and merely coordinated, action
will not be categorical, but will depend rather on the precision and
granularity with which we choose to deﬁne the “thing” or action
undertaken. This is conveniently illustrated by considering dancers
in a line dance – where the actions of each are, to a great degree –
identical, and dancers in a tango pair, where each dancer has a
rather different role from the other, but their joint action remains
highly coordinated. Clearly, if two or more people can synchronize
their actions, they share a speciﬁc skill. In what follows, the issue
of what it is to share a skill will ﬁnd some elaboration through
study of synchronization in both simple and complex cases.
Mathematically, synchronization may be understood as a
generic dynamical1 process whereby two or more oscillatory sys-
tems interact, such that their combined state admits of a simpler
(lower-dimensional) description than the mere enumeration of
the states of the individual components, especially when they cou-
ple such that their cycles adopt a ﬁxed phase relation (Pikovsky
et al., 2001). The space of possible stable relations two or more
systems can adopt will depend on both the form and strength of
their interaction, and also on the intrinsic dynamics of each system
considered autonomously. The more general notion of coordina-
tion is similarly captured by description of two or more interacting
dynamical systems whose effective joint state space when doing
some speciﬁc task is of lower dimension than the mere conjunc-
tion of the state spaces of the component systems (Haken et al.,
1985; Kelso, 1995).
1A good introduction to basic dynamical concepts as applied within cognitive
science can be found in Norton (1995).
The mathematics of synchronization has developed enor-
mously since its ﬁrst application in the physical sciences. When we
wish to employ this theoretical arsenal in the service of describing
synchronization phenomena in complex animate behavior, some
thought is in order. The mathematical notion of an oscillator,
and the pre-theoretical notion of an act (the “thing” implied in
the phrase “doing the same thing”), can only be aligned if some
care is taken to circumscribe the domain of observation, and the
interpretation of those observations within a sufﬁciently rigorous
framework. This paper will attempt to tease out issues of how
such dynamical concepts can properly be applied to understand
animate behavior.
A canonical and (perhaps deceptively) simple example is pro-
vided in describing the coordinated movement of a group of
dancers (Cummins, 2009a). The domain of observation is the
dance, measurements are spatio-temporal measurements, e.g.,
of limb/torso position and velocity, and the periodic nature of
the behavior allows a straightforward deﬁnition of phase, which
is essential to the quantitative description of synchronization.
“Phase” here will mean the relative time of an event with respect
to some containing and repeating unit, which in turn is deﬁned by
what it is we understand the dance to be.
The ability to synchronizewith an external signal, across a range
of tempi, when engaging in repetitive behavior is known as senso-
rimotor synchronization (Merker et al., 2009). It appears to be a
particularly humanability and is thus deservingof much attention.
Synchronization with a periodic referent is most commonly found
in one of two forms: in phase (matched down beats), or anti-phase
(syncopated). In what follows, I will augment the discussion of
simple sensorimotor synchronization with an instance of complex
synchronized behavior that clearly does not have a periodic basis.
This is the remarkable feat of two speakers speaking in synchrony.
The manifest absence of a periodic basis for synchronization in
this case presents a challenge to any explanatory framework that
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sees periodicity as the sine qua non of synchronization. The hope
is that rising to this challenge will help to reﬁne our vocabulary for
discussing synchronized behavior in a range of cases, and allow us
to come at such behavior afresh, with an eye on the deﬁnition of
skill, and how skills might be shared.
I will argue that non-periodic synchronization motivates a
framework for understanding perception and action that departs
fundamentally from cognitivist, information-processing models.
I advocate discarding the notion of the cognitive system as a
sequential processing chain with perceptual input leading ulti-
mately to action output, and replacing this view with an alter-
native in which behavior is described with respect to a tran-
sient and task-speciﬁc domain. For the coordinated action of
a single individual, identifying a given domain is tantamount
to addressing the challenge above of delimiting the “thing” that
actors may perform synchronously, or, indeed, of deﬁning what
is meant by the “dance.” The approach extends naturally to
domains that cut across boundaries of nervous system, body
and world, and speciﬁcally to domains deﬁned over multiple,
interacting, individuals. This alternative framework has much in
common with work in coordination dynamics (Kelso, 1995), eco-
logical psychology, and in theories of enactive perception, and
extends back to earlier suggestions arising in the work of John
Dewey.
2. PERIODIC AND APERIODIC SYNCHRONIZATION
2.1. SENSORIMOTOR SYNCHRONIZATION AS AMARK OF THE HUMAN
Synchronous behavior is often observed in the animal kingdom.
Some of the better studied examples include the synchronous
ﬂashing of ﬁreﬂies in both Asia (Hanson et al., 1971) and Amer-
ica (Copeland and Moiseff, 1994), claw waving in ﬁddler crab
courtship (Backwell et al., 1998), and chirping in katydids (Sis-
mondo, 1990). Weaker forms of synchronization, in which local
periodic movements become mutually coordinated, without rigid
frequency and phase locking, are commonplace in schooling,
shoaling, and ﬂocking behaviors.
What appears to be unique to humans, is the ability to synchro-
nize with an exogenous periodic signal at a wide variety of tempi
(Merker et al., 2009). Despite occasional prohibition, music and
dance occur, and exhibit tempo variation, in every human culture,
bearing witness to our ability to mutually entrain our movements,
given a periodic reference signal. Although we can synchronize to
a range of tempi, a strong preference for a tempo with a funda-
mental beat period of approximately 500 ms is well documented
(MacDougall andMoore, 2005).A similar ability is not to be found
in either apes or monkeys. A limited ability to track tempo changes
while moving in time with music has been documented in a cocka-
too (Patel et al., 2009), and some insects have been found to slightly
adjust the frequency of their behavior tomatch an external referent
(Ermentrout, 1991), but these interesting cases notwithstanding,
ﬂexible sensorimotor synchronization appears to be a particularly
human ability.
Accounts of how this behavior arises are often couched within
a cognitivist vocabulary that unquestioningly presumes the locus
of agency, and hence the causal origin of behavior, to be the cog-
nitive system of an individual, conceived of as a computational
system operating on perceptual input, and producing behavior in
the form of movement as output. This is the conventional frame-
work of cognitive psychology, and provides the setting for virtually
all of computational cognitive neuroscience. Within a cognitivist
framework, the task of perceiving temporal structure, and of reg-
ulating timing in movement is usually assigned to a timekeeping
component, such as the central clock in the inﬂuential timing
model of Wing and Kristofferson (1973). The central timekeeper
provides an amodal timing reference that can be availed of by
perceptual processes and motor processes alike.
We here adopt instead a dynamical perspective. Dynamical
modeling of behavior can be happily agnostic about the locus of
agency,and focus insteadondomainswithinwhich lawfulnessmay
be found in the spatio-temporal change over time of observables.
These domains may be transient in nature, they may cut across the
boundaries of nervous system,bodies, and environments, and they
may be deﬁned over multiple individuals as well as within a single
organism. For many of these reasons, dynamical systems theory is
rapidly becoming the lingua franca of post-cognitive approaches
to cognitive science,with emphasis on embodiment, enaction, and
the ecological embedding of organisms in environments (Kelso,
1995; Port and van Gelder, 1995; Stewart et al., 2011).
Synchronization is, of course, a dynamic phenomenon and is
most naturally described using the toolbox of dynamical concepts.
That can be done within a cognitivist framework as well, simply
by considering the organism to instantiate one system, a periodic
referent, such as a music signal or another dancer, to constitute
another, and to ensure that the two systems interact. However,
there are deeper reasons for adopting a non-cognitivist dynamical
stance in addressing coordination and synchronization. These are
motivated by the need to overcome the Cartesian presumptions
that separate the living subject from the physical and social world
in which they are embedded. But ﬁrst it will be necessary to moti-
vate that by turning to a puzzling case of synchronization without
any underlying periodicity.
2.2. APERIODIC SYNCHRONIZATION IN SYNCHRONOUS READING: A
PUZZLE
When two people are presented with a novel text and asked to read
the text in synchrony with one another, they typically have no dif-
ﬁculty in doing so, even though the task might appear prima facie
to be very complex. The constituents of speech, whether they be
considered at the phoneme, syllable, or phrasal level, exhibit great
temporal variability, even within the speech of a single individual.
This inherent variability contributes to the context-sensitivity and
expressiveness of the spoken word, and helps to make the voice
such an exquisitely plastic and communicative medium. In a syn-
chronous speech experiment, subjects are presented with a text
they have not seen before, are allowed to read it silently once, and
are then required to read in synchrony after the experimenter’s
signal. The mean asynchrony that is found when the two parallel
speech waveforms are compared is approximately 40 ms on aver-
age, rising to 60 ms at the start of phrases (Cummins, 2003). This
constitutes a very tight synchronization in which subjects diverge
by approximately a single frame of a video movie. Remarkably,
practice at the task does not lead to markedly better performance.
Rather, most subjects ﬁnd the task to be relatively easy, and they
do not require a lengthy period of acclimatization to either the
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task conditions, or to a speciﬁc co-speaker. It is never the case that
one speaker consistently leads and the other lags behind. Rather,
the speech of the two speakers seems to fuse, with only minimal
leading or lagging, and no consistent leader (Cummins, 2009b). It
may well be that one speaker is dominant over the other, but this
may be manifested in the establishment of a joint tempo closer
to the endogenous tempo of one speaker rather than the other, or
it may be manifested in differential speech volume, but it is not
evident in the relative timing of the two speakers.
Synchronous speech is highly constrained in an experimental
setting, and is thus to be distinguished from choral speech, familiar
from group recitations, oaths, prayers, etc. Choral speech typically
involves over-rehearsed texts recited in large groups with heavily
stylized prosody. Synchronous speech, in contrast, is often virtually
indistinguishable from normal read speech, as long as no speaker
makes a speech error.
Errors, when they arise, reveal the yoked, or coupled, nature of
the system. One frequently observed consequence of an error by
one speaker is the abrupt and simultaneous cessation of speech by
both speakers – a form of speech error not observed under con-
ventional conditions of speaking as an individual. This form of
catastrophic failure is indicative of a strong constraint obtaining
between the speakers, making them non-independent. A physi-
cal analogy can help here. In a three-legged race, the contestants
are required to run, and to coordinate that running with their
partner. The link between them is a physical one, as their legs
are tied together, thereby enforcing a strong constraint on their
movement. This inhibits, but does not prevent, running. Rather,
running of a somewhat constrained sort is possible, if the par-
ticipants coordinate successfully. If one makes an error, however,
a frequent consequence is the failure of the entire coordinative
ensemble, as both participants hit the ground in ungainly fashion.
So too, in a synchronous speaking scenario, one can imagine a
strong constraint yoking the two participants together, and bring-
ing the joint speaking activity to a halt as one makes an error.
This analogy will be ﬂeshed out and made rather more explicit
in the following section, where we will be particularly concerned
with characterizing the nature of the constraint linking the two
speakers.
Synchronous speaking poses an interesting puzzle. Despite pre-
theoretical notions of “rhythm” in speech, there is no strict period
to speech (Dauer, 1983). While there is a documented tendency
for alternating stresses (in English) to form quasi-regular series,
this tendency is continually frustrated and usurped by the vagaries
of syntax and lexical choice (Classé, 1939; Lehiste, 1977). There is
thus nothing in the speech signal that can act as a periodic refer-
ent. How, then, is such exquisite synchronization possible, despite
the heterogeneous nature of the signal? In what follows, I suggest
that we can recast our account of skilled action in a manner quite
different from the cognitivist account, and that doing so opens up
a novel space of potential accounts of coordinated behavior across
individuals more generally, and provides an interesting alterna-
tive view of just what sensorimotor synchronization is and why it
might be important. This dynamical perspective also has conse-
quences for the kind of activity we might expect to ﬁnd in brains
as people engage in coordinated and skilled behavior in real time
(see, for example, Tognoli et al., 2007; Dumas et al., 2010).
3. OF PERCEPTION, ACTION, AND SKILL
What is the difference between a gesture, such as an obscene hand
movement, and an involuntary twitch, such as a tic? The ﬁrst is
interpretable, or meaningful, if placed in the context of human-
human interaction. The second does not admit of any more
elaborate interpretation. To one who can not avail of the frame-
work of human communication, there is no obvious difference in
the simple observation of bodily movement in both cases. Like-
wise, the difference between a scrawl and a hand-written character
is not evident in the ink marks on a page, but in the framework
within which they are interpreted. If there is an alphabetic frame-
work with cursive writing conventions, we may interpret one as a
character.
Intentional action is distinguishable from mere movement, not
by differences in raw movement, but by the framework within
which those movements are interpreted. The deﬁnition of the
framework is a matter in part of convention and shared under-
standing. Writing systems and obscene gestures are not natural
kinds, but human conventions.
We can draw a similar distinction between sensory ﬂux2 and
perception. A given pattern of stimulation, be it luminance vari-
ation or sound pressure variation, is not intrinsically meaningful.
It becomes meaningful to the extent that it can be interpreted by
the subject based upon the subject’s knowledge of the world, of
sensorimotor contingencies, of perils and opportunities, of affor-
dances. In short, the subject must make use of sensory variation
within some interpretive framework.
When the head turns, there is a corresponding change in the
sensory variation at the retina. This may be cast within an action
framework (the subject is looking toward something) or a percep-
tion framework (the subject sees something), but both interpre-
tations go beyond the raw data of co-variation of movement and
sensory ﬂux. The degree to which we can interpret such move-
ment with attendant variation as an intentional act will depend
upon the observer and the framework within which the obser-
vation is made. The same head movement and attendant retinal
ﬂux might be described as “looking,” or as “having one’s attention
captured,” or as “checking to see if the coast is clear,” or as any
of an inﬁnity of other interpretive frameworks. Describing it as
constitutive of perception, or of willful action, will be licensed by
selecting an appropriate framing context (Kelso, 1981).
The view that perception and action are distinguishable from
sensory ﬂux and mere movement by virtue of interpretation
within an organizing domain was ﬁrst laid out by Dewey (1896).
He there took exception to the notion of the reﬂex arc, which
was emerging as a unifying concept in nineteenth Century psy-
chology (Dewey, 1896). Dewey describes the limitations of the
notion of viewing the organism as a one-way processing system,
with stimulus/perception as the input, and movement/action as
the output. In his critique, he foreshadows both the behavior-
ist and the cognitivist viewpoints, emphasizing their similarity
and the way in which the strict sequencing of perception and
action creates an artiﬁcial separation of organism and world. This
2I use the term sensory ﬂux to describe physical, chemical, and energetic change at a
receptor surface. No experiential attribute, conscious sensation, or qualia is meant.
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critique, now well over 100 years old, succinctly expresses many
of the reservations about the cognitivist orthodoxy that now ﬁnd
expression in embodied and enactive approaches to being (Hurley,
2001; Stewart et al., 2011). Dewey laments the characterization of
the relationship between organism and environment as a linear
throughput thus:
The sensory stimulus is one thing, the central activity, stand-
ing for the idea, is another thing, and the motor discharge,
standing for the act proper is a third. As a result, the
reﬂex arc is not a comprehensive, or organic unity, but a
patchwork of disjointed parts, a mechanical conjunction
of unallied processes. . .What shall we term that which is
not sensation-followed-by-idea-followed-by-movement, but
which is primary. . .Stated on the physiological side, this real-
ity may most conveniently be termed coördination.
(Dewey, 1896, p. 358)
For Dewey, the sensorimotor coordination is the overarching
domain within which we can make sense of perception and
of action, but each must be interpreted with respect to the
coordination:
In other words, the real beginning is with the act of seeing;
it is looking, and not a sensation of light. The sensory quale
gives the value of the act, just as the movement furnishes its
mechanism and control, but both sensation and movement
lie inside, not outside the act.
(Dewey, 1896,p. 358/359)
We can contrast a cognitivist and a dynamical view of what it
is to speak. On the former, cognitivist, view, there is a speech
production system and a speech perception system. These may
share representational resources (Liberman and Mattingly, 1985;
Goldstein et al., 2006), but their functional separation is a start-
ing point for developing an account of what speech is. Within the
speech production system so conceived, an intention is formed by
a notional executive, that becomes the basis for commands ema-
nating from the center to the periphery, resulting in movement,
that in turn results in speech sound. This efﬁcient causal chain
constitutes the speech production system. This chain is illustrated
in the top row of Figure 1.
Alternatively, in the spirit of Dewey, one might suggest that
speech might be understood as skilled action in which both the
movement and the sound are subsumed and interpretable within
an overarching coordinative framework, which is the skilled act
of speaking. The present author has been speaking for almost
50 years. In that time, every single utterance (conceived of as
movement) was accompanied (not followed) by speech sounds.
Speech sounds, and speech articulations co-occur; they are not
in sequence. The coordinative framework proposed here suggests
that that skill ismanifested in the co-registration of movement and
sound. To be a skilled speaker is to alignmovement and sound such
that speech results.Aswithmoveswithin a tango dance,or obscene
gestures, speech sounds are not natural kinds, and we can not
look for purely naturalistic criteria for distinguishing speech from
non-speech. Rather, speech is a skill, and the nature of that skill
emerges within a group of speakers, in the collective acceptance
and preference for some sequences of sounds over others.
FIGURE 1 |Top: cognitivist view of speech production, from executive
to product. Bottom, left: coordinative view of speech production, in which
the coordination of sound and movement creates the appropriate boundary
conditions for speaking. Bottom, right: similar view of synchronous speech,
in which the sound component includes both endogenous and exogenous
parts.
When a baby babbles, toying with the various combinatorial
and coordinative possibilities afforded by its vocal tract, it is learn-
ing that certain sounds and certain movements go together, not
that some movements are followed by speciﬁc sounds. When it
then alights upon successful coordinations that produce speech-
like syllables, it has brought into being a higher-order coordinative
domain deﬁned and constituted by the mutual relations of sound
and movement. The criteria that distinguish felicitous coordina-
tions from mere uninterpretable babbling will be found both in
the infant’s own view of similarity to speech sounds occurring in
its environment, and in the differential reaction of its environ-
ment to the speech it utters, reinforcing some coordinations, and
ignoring others. On this view, to be a skilled speaker is to exhibit
mastery over the sensorimotor contingencies of speaking, keeping
the mutual relations of movement and sound such that the cri-
teria of skilled performance are met. It is the nature of the skill
that provides the boundary conditions that serve to delimit skill
from non-skill, and the boundaries separating speech from non-
speech will become more clearly deﬁned with practice, though
they remain at all times somewhat plastic and sensitive to the
contingencies of the context within which speech occurs.
This second view of what the act of speaking is, is illustrated in
the bottom left of Figure 1. The skilled action of speaking is seen
as a tight synergistic alignment of movement and sound, with
neither one being temporally ordered before the other. Before
progressing to consider the more complex case of synchronous
speech, the coordinative view of skilled action being developed
here may serve to shed light upon some other known character-
istics of speech production. Articulatory movements and speech
sounds always co-occur, and skilled speaking is the felicitous cre-
ation and maintenance of this tight reciprocal coupling of the
two. It is immediately apparent then why delayed auditory feed-
back (DAF) should be so destructive of ﬂuent speech production
(Yates, 1963). By time-shifting the sound component, the very con-
ditions that instantiate the act of speaking are removed. It is just
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as if one were to time-delay the movements of one dancer in a
tango-dancing pair. Disastrous miscoordination and a fall would
surely result.
We might note that speaking without making use of the speech
sound is possible, and can itself be considered a skill, as shown by
the relative inefﬁcacy of DAF in disrupting the speech of expe-
rienced polyglot simultaneous interpreters (Fabbro and Daro,
1995). This might be compared to the skill of touching one’s
nose with closed eyes. In both cases, the sensorimotor coordina-
tion is constituted by a suitably constrained relationship between
movement and proprioception, instead of between movement and
sound/vision (+ proprioception). From this perspective, it may
seem less mysterious that playing loud noise at a stutterer can help
to overcome stuttering: it effectively changes the task of speaking
from the mutual coordination of movement and sound, to the
coordination of movement and proprioception. This is, of course,
by no means a full explanation, but rather a descriptive frame-
work within which the properties of sensorimotor coordination
may admit of novel forms of description.
It is precisely this shift in explanatory scaffolding,or framework,
that will now be employed in reconsideration of synchronous
speech, and subsequently, of sensorimotor synchronization.
4. SYNCHRONIZATION RECONSIDERED
The bottom right panel of Figure 1 provides a way of understand-
ing synchronization among speakers, without making reference to
a periodic framework. In this view, the speaking act still consists of
the alignment of movement and sound, but the sound employed is
now a fusion or superposition of two distinct signals: An endoge-
nously generated signal, as before, and an exogenously generated
signal, that stems from the co-speaker. These two signals together
constitute the sensory arc of the sensorimotor coordination that is
speaking. In this respect, the co-speaker, through their speech, co-
creates the framework that instantiates the act of speaking of the
ﬁrst speaker, or, to put it slightly differently, the speech of the other
becomes formally incorporated into the condition of speaking of
the ﬁrst.
An analogy of a three-legged race was provided before. Under
the present approach, the constraint, or tie, that binds the two
speakers consists in the fact that each of them integrates the
speech of the other within their respective sensorimotor coor-
dination that is the act of speaking. It has been demonstrated that,
although speakers can synchronize to some extent with a record-
ing of another person, and the degree of synchrony is greater if the
recording is of someonewhowas recordedwhile themselves speak-
ing synchronously, there is still an advantage for the situation in
which two speakers interact in real time (Cummins, 2009b). This
makes sense if each speaker is, in a very real sense, constraining
the other in this way.
Interestingly, speaking in unison with others is also an effec-
tive way of overcoming stuttering in many cases (Kalinowski and
Saltuklaroglu, 2003). A conventional account of this would claim
that the stutterer is imitating the speech of co-speakers, perhaps
facilitated by the mirror neuron system, or similar. The account
that suggests itself in the present context is simpler. The speech of
others is playing a role in stabilizing the coordinative domain that
is constitutive of the act of speaking. When speaking alone, the
stutterer is not successful at establishing the required coordina-
tion of movement and sound, but by augmenting the endogenous
signal with an intact exogenous signal, speech is made possible.
Instead of providing an account of synchronized behavior in
which periodicity provides a system-external temporal referent
with respect to which actions might be timed, the present view
suggests that the common skill that two competent speakers have
acquired forms the basis for the phenomenon of synchronization.
On this view, to have the skill of speaking is precisely the capacity
to co-align movement and sound in a manner that is sufﬁcient to
be accepted as speech by both the speaker and her environment.
But that alone is not enough to account for the synchronization
observed. To this we must add the remarkable ability of replacing
the endogenously produced sound with a composite signal that
is a fusion of an endogenous and an exogenous sound. That is,
indeed, a signiﬁcant achievement, but it is by no means without
precedent.
For this is surely precisely what is demonstrated in the sim-
pler case of sensorimotor synchronization. Let us now consider
what it is to bob one’s head, torso, or foot along with some music.
Any oscillatory movement of the body generates sensory varia-
tion that is periodic. This is entirely modality independent, so
that proprioceptive, visual, and auditory variation all provide the
same information. If one regards bobbing/tapping/bouncing as an
extremely rudimentary skill (shared by humans and almost all ani-
mals), then the exercise of that skill lies precisely in constraining
movement such that the attendant sensory ﬂux varies in periodic
fashion, or, equivalently, such that the rate of change is approxi-
mately constant. What humans seem to have added, somewhere
in the time since our evolutionary path last diverged from that of
the other great apes, is the remarkable ability to employ a fusion
of an endogenously generated sensory ﬂux and an exogenously
generated pattern of variation, so that they collectively function as
the sensory arc of the sensorimotor coordination that is rhythmic
bobbing. In this way, a group of people dancing to music will be
bound together in their movement, not only through the music,
but through the visual registration of phase in the movements of
the others. Rhythm, I have claimed elsewhere, may fruitfully be
deﬁned as an affordance for the entrainment of movement (Cum-
mins, 2009a). This notion can now be ﬂeshed out through the
unifying concept of the sensorimotor coordination,and it becomes
immediately apparent why rhythm should be such a potent force
in getting people to move together.
5. DISCUSSION
This article offered synchronization among concurrent speakers as
a puzzle. It is a puzzle, because the phenomenon of synchroniza-
tion in behavior is typically addressedusing amodeling framework
based on oscillatory processes. Periodicity is a striking facet of
most behaviors that we might describe as synchronized, and the
mathematics of interacting oscillators provides a convenient and
powerful framework for quantitative and qualitative modeling.
And yet this approach seems to rule out any account of aperiodic
synchronization, generating a strict division between two kinds of
phenomena, which otherwise seem to have much in common. It
also offers no help at all in understanding how we might presume
to model aperiodic synchronization.
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One-way to re-unite both periodic and aperiodic synchronized
behaviors is made possible by recognizing that in each case, move-
ment and sensory change are highly constrained by the nature of
the task. The task of rhythmic bobbing or toe tapping is so simple
as to barely merit the application of the term “skill,” for simple
periodic oscillation is an ability we share with almost all living
creatures. But if we cast it as a skill, deﬁned by the constraint of
movement such that it accompanies a constant rate of change in
sensory ﬂux, it then becomes apparent that our species-speciﬁc
ability to track the ﬂuctuating tempo of an external source of
rhythm is more than an idiosyncratic party trick. When people
gather to make music together, or to dance in groups, each partic-
ipant is creating and maintaining a sensorimotor coordination in
which one arc is generated collectively. This ability to share a skill
is what we have, and the jellyﬁsh does not.
Sensorimotor synchronization allows the tight synchronization
of action in marching, rowing, and in collective heaving or pulling,
as in a tug of war. In all of these instances, simple periodicity in
the behavior ensures that the auditory information shared among
participants aligns with visual and proprioceptive information,
providing robust multimodal support for action timing. In syn-
chronous speaking, we see that this ability to collectively bring
about synchronous skilled behavior can extend to complex, time
varying behavior as well, just in case the individuals share a suf-
ﬁciently constrained deﬁnition of the skill in question. This is,
perhaps uniquely, the case for speech.
5.1. COMMON CODE AND IDEOMOTOR THEORIES
The linear sequence of the cognitivist orthodoxy that starts with
sensation/perception and results in intentional action has been
under attack from many quarters. One of the oldest and most
severe criticisms comes from the recognition that perception and
action are inextricably linked, and must be understood together.
William James observed that:
Every representation of a movement awakens in some degree
the actual movement which is its object; and awakens it in a
maximum degree whenever it is not kept from doing so by
an antagonistic representation present simultaneously in the
mind
(James, 1890, vol. II, p. 526).
This view has found signiﬁcant elaboration in the common code
theory of Prinz (1984, 2005). On this view, action and perception
are inextricably linked because they make use of a common rep-
resentational substratum. The perceptual effects of actions give
rise to the neural representation of those actions, with the result
that observation of action activates the same representations that
would be employed in carrying out the same acts. This theoreti-
cal approach is buttressed by many experimental observations of
the effect of action on perception (Kilner et al., 2003; Wilson and
Knoblich, 2005). A rather speciﬁc form of common code theory
has been mooted in the speech domain with the proposition that
speech perception and speech production employ common repre-
sentations (LibermanandMattingly,1985).An even closer relation
between the production and perception of speech is implied by
the ﬁndings of Fadiga et al. (2002) that listening to speech can be
shown to elicit subliminal activation of the articulators that would
be used to produce that speech. This ﬁnding, obtained using tran-
scranial magnetic stimulation, suggests that the listener literally
resonates to the speech being heard.
The momentum accorded to theories of common representa-
tionhas increased enormously since the discovery of so-calledmir-
ror neurons in monkey brains (Rizzolatti and Craighero, 2004).
These neurons, as is all too well known, are found to ﬁre prefer-
entially both in carrying out speciﬁc goal-directed actions, such
as grasping, and in observing someone else carrying out the same
action. The import of this discovery will depend greatly on the
view of perception and action adopted.
On the cognitivist view for which perception and action are
separate, this is indeed extremely strong evidence that a common
representational basis might play a role in linking the two distinct
functions. Common representation has been mooted as a basis for
understanding the actions of others, for empathy, and for more
besides (Gallese, 2001).
On the view being pursued here, the discovery raises important
questions about how a goal is to be deﬁned, and what the circum-
stances are under which equivalence appears in neural activity
when acting or observing action. Movement and sensory ﬂux
are uninterpretable without a superordinate domain with refer-
ence to which they can be understood. Likewise, neural activation
will be uninterpretable without speciﬁcation of the setting under
which it is observed, and the formal inclusion of that speciﬁcation
in the apportioning of functional relevance to the activity. The
importance of Dewey’s approach lies in the freeing of functional
explanation from the limits of a single domain, the cognitive sys-
tem, with respect to which function is deﬁned. Instead, a plurality
of domains is established, each task-speciﬁc and context bound.
We are a longway fromhaving any such account of neural activ-
ity. The present thesis suggests that the development of a theory of
goals and skill in individual and in joint action is a precondition
to understanding nervous system activity in intentional action.
5.2. COORDINATION DYNAMICS
The sensorimotor coordination posited byDewey bearsmany sim-
ilarities to the notion of a coordinative structure (Kelso et al., 1980;
Kugler et al., 1980; or synergy Latash, 2008), as this concept is
applied in the study of skilled action. An early and hugely signif-
icant observation was made by the Russian physiologist, Nikolai
Bernstein, who found that skilled blacksmiths, when striking an
anvil repeatedly, generated movement in which variability was
minimized at the point of contact between anvil and hammer
(Bernstein, 1967; Latash, 2008). In a link segment effector sys-
tem, this observation rules out a puppeteer role for the central
nervous system, as any errors or noise introduced closer to the
center, say at the shoulder, would be ampliﬁed and added to fur-
ther out, at elbow,wrist, and especially at the distal point of contact
between anvil and hammer. Rather, he observed, the entire body
and tool assemblage functioned as though it were a task-speciﬁc
device, with vastly fewer degrees of freedom than the sum of its
several components. When engaged in the task, a perturbation
introduced at any one point was smoothly compensated for by
other elements within the overall coordinative domain. Likewise,
in speech production, it has been shown that a perturbation to the
jaw administered in unpredictable fashion,will generate an almost
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immediate compensatory response that is speciﬁc to the speech
production goals existing at the time of the perturbation (Kelso
et al., 1984). A downward thrust to the jaw during the second /b/
segment of /bab/ produced an almost immediate compensatory
response in the upper lip, while an identical perturbation during
/z/ production in /baz/ resulted in a compensatory response in the
tongue body, appropriate for forming a /z/ articulation.
A coordinative structure, sometimes also called a synergy, is a
task-speciﬁc, ﬂexibly assembled system comprising parts of the
body (or body+ tools) that function together in the service of
a well-deﬁned behavioral goal. The concept is critical in under-
standing the role of the brain in movement, which is not, as
popularly assumed, that of controlling the muscles individually,
but rather of contributing to the constraining of movement in a
task-speciﬁc fashion. The novel perspective provided by Dewey’s
notion of a sensorimotor coordination is to show how this coordi-
native domain is constituted,not just by structuredmovement, but
by constraining the relation between movement and the attendant
sensory changes.
5.3. GIBSON, ECOLOGICAL APPROACHES, AND SKILLED ACTION
Gibson (1966, 1979) developed a thoroughly radical stance in try-
ing to understand both perception and action. Instead of worrying
about what was going on in the head of a subject, Gibson looked
at the lawfulness that inheres in the co-variation of movement
and sensory ﬂux within a speciﬁc environment. For very simple
behavioral goals, this lawfulness can be approached analytically,
as shown by the work of Lee and Reddish (1981). In the seminal
work that introduced the concept of the tau variable to the visual
control of action, they noted that the rate of expansion of the
pattern of light and dark on the retina of an organism approach-
ing a ﬁxed surface is directly proportional to the time to contact
between the two parties. This“information”lies in themutual rela-
tion of organism and world, and does not require or beneﬁt from
the addition of notional cognitive mechanisms for extracting and
processing the information.
Gibsonian approaches tease out the lawfulness that inheres in
the embedding of an active organism in its environment. In this
way, they provide an invaluable basis for developing an account of
how movement and sensory ﬂux co-vary in a task-speciﬁc man-
ner. Gibsonian approaches run into explanatory limits, however,
as the behavior to be characterized becomes more complex. Even
in the canonical case of a diving gannett, the interpretation of
expansion of the pattern of light and dark on the retina as informa-
tion is only licensed by a framing understanding of the organism
as an entity for whom a future collision is of systemic impor-
tance. For more complex behaviors, the informational relevance
of any variable we care to measure will only be meaningful if
interpreted within a context that deﬁnes and delimits the behav-
ior itself. Speech is only speech by virtue of the conventions and
habits of an entire speech community, and a full account of speak-
ing will have to refer to such conventions if the skill is to be fully
described.
5.4. THEORIES OF ENACTION
The coordinative focus adopted herein has been informed, in part,
by the emerging enactive approach to mind and life, originating
in the biological theories of Maturana and Varela (1980), formu-
lated in The Embodied Mind (Varela et al., 1991), and expanded
upon more recently in Thompson (2007) and Stewart et al. (2011).
Within this somewhat heterogeneous body of work, an emphasis is
placed on the mutuality that exists between organism and world.
If we regard an organism as an autonomous entity with a great
number of constitutive degrees of freedom, then it becomes clear
that such a system can potentially take part in coordinations that
span the borders between an individual body and its environment.
Indeed, the active embodied interaction of an organism with its
surround is seen as the very basis for the emergence of mind.
Within the enactive tradition, the same principles of autonomy
and coordination can be applied from the level of the single cell,
through multicellular organisms, up to the level of social organiza-
tion. For social interaction, De Jaegher and Di Paolo (2007) have
taken one of the explanatory pillars of enaction, sense-making,
and extended it to what they call “participatory sense-making,” by
which they mean the collective establishment and maintenance
of supra-personal domains of relative autonomy, the interactional
domains, that arise in the reciprocal coordination of two or more
individuals. Appealing to the dynamical concepts of coupling
and entrainment, they propose the following deﬁnition of social
interaction:
Social interaction is the regulated coupling between at least
two autonomous agents, where the regulation is aimed at
aspects of the coupling itself so that it constitutes an emer-
gent autonomous organization in the domain of relational
dynamics, without destroying in the process the autonomy
of the agents involved (though the latter’s scope can be aug-
mented or reduced).
(De Jaegher and Di Paolo, 2007, p. 8)
The present contribution extends this notion directly, by propos-
ing that the delimitation of the constraints that deﬁne a task may
allow us to apply the dynamical concepts of coupling among indi-
viduals with somewhat more rigor. In common with the participa-
tory sense-making notion, I have here emphasized the mutuality
that exists, in a very literal sense, when two skilled actors syn-
chronize, temporarily bringing into being a higher-level domain
of coordination that is the dyad.
6. CONCLUSION
The puzzle posed by synchronized speaking lies in the absence of
a periodic referent suitable for generating temporal expectations
in concurrent speakers. This apparent anomaly has motivated a
fundamental reconsideration of the descriptive framework within
which skilled action is viewed. The sensorimotor coordination,
ﬁrst suggested by Dewey (1896), has been employed to frame
an account of skilled action that permits a uniﬁed treatment of
periodic and aperiodic synchronization. On this account, skilled
action lies in constraining the co-occurrence of movement and
sensory variation such that the criteria that serve to deﬁne a skill
are met. Given this framing, synchronization can be described as
skilled action in which the sensory arc of a sensorimotor coordi-
nation is collectively constituted. In this way, the constraint can
be made explicit that yokes together the actions of people moving
collectively with common goal.
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The approach may, perhaps, seem to be question begging, plac-
ing as it does most of the structure and complexity of behavior on
the framing constraints that deﬁne a skill. But unless we take the
objectionable step of claiming that behaviors are natural kinds,
this shift in focus seems necessary. The boundaries of speech are
to be found in the conventions and practices of a community, not
in the structure of the speech signal considered in isolation.
The emphasis on the context and constraints within which
behavior happens may serve as one more contribution to a grow-
ing body of work that plays down hypothetical internal processes
assumed to underlie behavior, emphasizing instead the totality
of observables, from neural activity, through movement, to the
context in which behavior is observed.
The framework advocated here could be seen as a radical break
from information-processing accounts of cognitive functioning.
Alternatively, it could be regarded as nothing more than a worked
example of empirical behavioral research that does what most of
us do most of the time: look for local solutions to local problems.
By positing that movement and attendant sensory variation are
interpretable only within an appropriate frame of reference, we
are doing nothing more outlandish than pointing out that kicking
the ball into the net only constitutes a goal if it happens during a
game of football. The principal contrast with cognitivist psycho-
logical theories lies in the context-speciﬁcity of any interpretation
of movement, or of nervous system activity. Dynamical, coordina-
tive approaches to understanding behavior do not refer to a single
monolithic cognitive system. Rather, lawfulness may be found in
task-speciﬁc contexts, within domains constituted by part of a
person, a whole person, a person with a tool, or groups of people.
The domains within which lawfulness is found will be emergent,
and will be characterized by the generic dynamical principles of
self-organization in complex systems.
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